

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Department of State

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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1040, January 15, 9 p.m.

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DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, PARIS BONN. SENT DEPARTMENT 1040,
REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 118, PARIS 339, BONN 197.

Have completed formal calls on Foreign Office and seen most
chiefs diplomatic missions. While I indicated readiness call
on whomever he desired, Protocol chief suggested only Malik
and USA affairs officer Bazykin, not (repeat not) mentioning
Vishinsky, whom I have not (repeat not) asked to see. Except
for three long interviews convoked by Malik, who alleged USA
delay in providing plumbing for new building, Foreign Office
conversations were confined to polite exchanges with no (repeat
no) reference political problems.

Speculation, which is chief activity diplomatic corps, centers
at present on possible new USA moves Far East and on Soviet
reaction in coming USA administration. Anti-American campaign
has shown no (repeat no) relaxation except to continue to exempt
General Eisenhower and his associates from advice and attacks.
Hard, skeptical line is taken by British and Commonwealth repre-
sentatives who, although acknowledging Soviet political activity
in waiting posture, see as yet no (repeat no) concrete evidence
change Soviet policy of intransigence and enmity to West. New
Turkish Ambassador believes Soviets will make no (repeat no)
basic concession unless forced by danger of war, which they
desire avoid at all costs. He considers Soviets satisfied with
USA commitment in Far Eastern war without similar involvement
themselves and feels they will be encouraged in divide and con-
quer tactics by what he regards as Western retreat last NATO
meeting. Following Soviet rejection UN prisoner of war resolu-
tion, Indian Ambassador, who is man independent thinking, also
foresees small hope immediate change. He claims certain knowledge
Chinese were ready accept face-saving solution whereby they would
disinterest themselves in numerical proportion prisoners of war
in Korea, but he admits he made no (repeat no) headway in approach
to Chinese colleague here, who consistently maintained USA blocked
settlement. Indian Ambassador of opinion Kremlin persuaded
Chinese prisoner of war agreement would not (repeat not) produce
settlement Far Eastern problems at this time.

Indian more balanced than some neutralist colleagues like Burmese
and Iranian, who regard world conflict as chief responsibility
of US and

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of US and USSR, within power of each to stop. Portrayal by Soviet press of USA as chief antagonist has obviously produced some effect local diplomatic circles, as it may have elsewhere. British Ambassador concerned about impression Soviets have succeeded in creating of isolated US position, and he feels other countries freely subscribing to Western system and accepting USA aid should voluntarily or through suggestion defend USA motives as common to all.

Middle ground of pure theory and speculation is adopted by some French and Italian colleagues who, while acknowledging Russian strategy of subversion and confusion will continue, nevertheless feel coming year may produce some flexibility in Soviet tactics. Stalin replies to Reston interview are cited as possible first maneuver aimed yield results any one of which would be advantageous to Kremlin: (1) Stalin has made peaceful gesture, rejection of which would be USA responsibility; (2) USA leading role in any future discussions with Soviets would be admission of responsibility provoking doubt and discord among Allies; (3) should great power discussions eventuate after successful preparation, Soviets might propose over-all modus vivendi which would doom development Western defense and permit them consolidate their bloc and relieve their economy. As to pivotal question of Germany, one theory is advanced that Soviets might be prepared to concede that total of German forces in both Eastern and Western zones be kept militarily inferior to those of France.

French Ambassador, who is entirely skeptical Soviet intentions, feels, however, Russians may produce new maneuver capitalize on recent evidences Western division. While not (repeat not) inclined to believe Stalin is sentimentalist he thinks Stalin nevertheless retains great respect for Allied wartime associates and might wish to renew contacts with Churchill and General Eisenhower in attempt to produce a relaxation of tension and vigilance useful for Soviet ends.

Above presented as summary various local opinions rather than Embassy view, which remains one of reserved skepticism pending Soviet reaction to events of next few weeks, which in turn may yield clearer indication Soviet tactics.

Re domestic affairs observers report noticeable physical improvement, particularly last two months, due availability consumer goods from satellites which has helped city population clothe themselves not (repeat not) stylishly, but warmly and fairly adequately. Foreigners making recent trips state individual Russians seem to accept propaganda re USA aggression in Far East but apparently without much bitterness as yet since they do not (repeat not) regard themselves as directly involved. No (repeat no) signs hostility to Western representatives in Moscow and feeling only occasionally evident at anti-US plays attended by model Soviet workers. Compared to the sullen individualistic

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opposition of Yugoslavs, Moscow city population seems accustomed accept moral debasement and demands communism in more business-like manner with principal aim of staying out of trouble. In Moscow at least, national pride and dread of another war seem diluted by atmosphere of artificial calm prevailing in storm center of world conflict. Corruption and inefficiency almost daily criticized in press and administration is held to have sufficient experience and momentum to produce at least most planned results. Deficiencies attacked in current propaganda drive are those inherent in system itself where state is only and harshest employer.

Anti-Semitic action at first regarded by some observers as primarily aimed, with subsidiary purpose of appealing to Germans and Arabs, at type of Jewish intellectual whose mind, manner of discussion and international interest do not (repeat not) submit readily to rigidity Communist doctrine. Many now (repeat now) fearful however that unless checked, anti-Semitism will extend to mistreatment Jewish population in cities and Ukraine. Troubles underlying Slansky and Moscow doctor's trials apparently sufficiently serious to warrant Communists taking measures forfeiting leftwing liberal support to which peace congresses intended to appeal. Although extent to which Moscow doctor's may have ramifications among top hierarchy is uncertain, effects of suggested disciplinary and vigilance measures, which in themselves may reflect expectation of intensified enmity with West, may be far-reaching among certain classes, and a few observers report some general uneasiness. These stresses which are possibly further evidenced in running press dispute over economic theory cannot (repeat not) but help diminish show of strength and stability staged at party congress. As yet they do not (repeat not) seem to have tarnished the facade of Stalin's recent public appearances where his commanding stature contrasts strongly with the relative lack of appeal other leaders.

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NOTE: Passed to London, Paris, Bonn 1/15/53, 8:15 p.m., GC.